Rebuilding Fortress Europe, Building Fortress USA: From Discursive to Physical Boundaries against Refugees on a Global Level

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Abstract

It is difficult to properly emphasize the increase in xenophobia on a global level, from discourse to appropriate policies. Though Donald Trump’s “wall” has become a world-known feature, fences have been built in numerous places within Europe as well. Xenophobic discourses are increasingly used as a means for gaining electoral support, after which “adequate” policies are being introduced. From the “immigrant” or “guest worker” to the “refugee” or “asylum seeker”, these people have been shunned on an institutional and media level, invisible in their plight for decades, oftentimes painted as criminals. With the resurgence of xenophobia, their visibility increased only to be put in a negative spotlight, as scapegoats instead of victims. This article deals with the discursive construction of the Enemy from the refugee in the Middle East from the methodological standpoint of Critical Discourse Analysis, as well as how this exclusionary, discriminative discourse in turn creates xenophobic policies on a global scale.

Key words: xenophobia, borders, walls, refugees, discourse, policy, media

1. Introduction

On 17 April 2015, Katie Hopkins wrote the following, in an article in the Sun: “No, I don’t care. Show me pictures of coffins, show me bodies floating in water, play violins and show me skinny people looking sad. I still don’t care. Because in the next minute you’ll show me pictures of aggressive young men at Calais, spreading like norovirus on a cruise ship” (Hopkins, 2015). The article’s very title, furthermore, was Rescue boats? I’d use gunships to stop migrants, and it is safe to say that it represents an avid example of extreme xenophobic discourse that has been growing in intensity and frequency since the outbreak of

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the refugee arrivals from the Middle East, one in which the “solution” to a solipsistic problem was inciting of violence and coxing into murder. The article was removed after a public outcry, but the damage has been done. It was official that incitement of violence and murder of refugees could enter public discourse via the media. Yet, discourse itself is not promulgated without a reason. When Viktor Orban spoke repeatedly about an “illiberal nation state” (Shekovtsov, 2015) by playing to xenophobic sentiments, it was with a clear goal to create an illiberal nation state, which Hungary nowadays is. When it comes to Hopkins, “tellingly, she summed up her call for European governments to take a more violent approach to refugees” (Iltis, 2015, p. 16), which is, in essence, what happened on a policy level both in Europe and the United States. As Kern wrote already in 2015, “faced with an avalanche of migrants, a growing number of EU member states have moved decisively to put their own national interests above notions of EU solidarity” (Kern, 2015). Discourse can be defined, at the level of politics, as an introductory instance in the creation of public policy. Politicians, as well as those who support them, from journalists to public figures, promulgate specific discourses in order to promote the policies and practices they tend to enact. In the words of Wodak and Reisigl, “through discourse, discriminatory exclusionary practices are prepared, promulgated and legitimated” (Wodak & Reisigl, 1999, pp. 175-176).

The rise of xenophobia in Europe – both in discourse and following policy – is nowadays directly related to the arrival of refugees from the Middle East and the ongoing conflict. However, we have to emphasize that this is not entirely novel, as scholars have noted even three decades ago, that “one of the most serious social problems in Western Europe is the growing racism or ethnicism against immigrants from Mediterranean countries and former colonies” (T A van Dijk, 1989, p. 199). With xenophobic sentiments already having taken root, the refugee crisis served only to exacerbate them, so that nowadays we are witnesses to what Thomas called the “institutionalization of xenophobia in Europe” (Thomas, 2009, p. 1), as from discourse, xenophobia has been “upgraded” to policy, much in the vein of Schmidt’s Discursive Insitutionalism (Schmidt, 2008). With the election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States of America, the same could be said about the States. The “increased border control” at international airports in the USA has resulted in numerous discriminatory measures, from people being kept at the airport for undefined amounts of time (even citizens) and mistreated, resulting in severe emotional
distress (in “lighter” cases), to even people not being allowed to come to the country in order to perform medical procedures or unite with their families.

The issue at hand has oft been called “Fortress Europe”, even within scholarly production (Bendel, 2005; Geddes, 2003; Geddes & Taylor, 2015; Lutz, 1997; Mandel, 1994; Van Avermaet, 2009), as entering Europe has proven to get increasingly difficult over the decades, especially asylum seekers and refugees, due to the ever-increasing discriminatory policies and practices, promulgated by their propagators via xenophobic discourse. In other words, allegations of establishing a fortress Europe to the disadvantage of the third and developing world, refugees, asylum seekers, the poor and finally with detrimental effects for the very basic values of open and democratic societies based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, have been voiced since the eighties when the first signs of a common European Union immigration policy became visible (Albrecht, 2002, p. 1).

With the infamous “wall” that is supposed to be built on the border between the USA and Mexico, as well as the “Muslim ban” and increased “security measures” on border controls within the USA, we might as well talk about “Fortress USA” nowadays, as entering the country is becoming increasingly difficult, even for its citizens. Boundaries and borders have become a grim reality, as the “expanding immigrant numbers have gone hand in hand, both with a restriction on immigrants’ rights and with a growing divergence between demography and democracy” (Waldinger, 2008, p. 308).

When it comes to the study of borders, “borders are now pre-dominantly critically investigated as differentiators of socially constructed mindsapes and meaning” (Van Houtum, 2005, p. 673), following the pioneering work of Julian Minghi, who elaborated how “the study of international boundaries in political geography, however, must also take the view that boundaries, as political dividers, separate peoples of different nationalities and, therefore, presumably of different iconographic makeup” (Minghi, 1963, p. 428). Having in mind the emphasis on one’s nationality, i.e. the passport that is used in the crossing of borders, this phenomenon has also been dubbed “passportism”, defined as the “speech, policy or act of a discriminative nature, in which an individual or a group of individuals are discriminated against on the basis of their citizenship, i.e. passport” (Jovanović, 2015). Having in mind the physical boundaries that have been set via xenophobic discourses and policies, though, we shall concentrate here on the physical boundaries and prohibition that have been set as policies in Europe and the USA, via deconstructing the discourse that has led to their
formation, having in mind that Houtum’s “socially constructed mindscapes and meaning” have led to the construction of physical boundaries. Never have Minghi’s words rung truer: boundaries “are perhaps the most palpable political geographic phenomena” (Minghi, 1963, p. 407) nowadays. They are increasingly being promoted by media discourse, which is what we shall tackle through the prism of Critical Discourse Analysis, which is, according to Wodak and Meyer, “not interested in investigating a linguistic unit per se but in studying social phenomena” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 2).

2. Methodology and data

Before border/boundary policies were established, a steadfast xenophobic discourse promoting it was set in motion via the media, as “such discourses affect both the level of society and the institutional level” (Rubio-Carbonero & Zapata-Barrero, 2017, p. 204). In a recent article by Carta and Wodak, the connection of discourse and politics was further stressed, noting that “Discourse analysis can be of great use in illuminating the way in which social discursive practices convey meaning to foreign policy discourses, through both contestation and communicative action” (Carta & Wodak, 2015, p. 3). This is why a critical approach to discourse per se is needed to gauge the levels of xenophobia that has introduced the building of walls and fences, as it puts an “emphasis on the role of language in mediating and constructing social reality” (Checkel, 2007, p. 58). Having in mind that xenophobia has been used in order to strengthen political positions of those who partake in it, to establish dominance and introduce discriminative practices, a discourse analytical perspective imposes itself, as

CDA might thus be defined as being fundamentally interested in analyzing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control when these are manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use (or in discourse) (Wodak, 2006a, p. 4).

This is all often achieved by manipulation that often takes form of media articles, also defined as “illegitimate domination confirming social inequality ... Discursively, manipulation generally involves the usual forms and formats of ideological discourse, such as emphasizing Our good things, and emphasizing Their bad things” (T. A. van Dijk, 2006). Manipulation, hegemony, promotion of social inequality, relations of (desired) dominance and power are all an integral part of today’s xenophobic discourses. The select corpus of xenophobic text used
for analysis in this article is global; the texts were selected from media sources that have been known to contribute to the discursive promotion and spread of xenophobia within Europe and the USA, such as the Daily Mail (UK) and Breitbart (USA) on a more global level, to local newspapers and portals, such as Avpixlat (Sweden), Uued Uudised (Estonia), Kurir (Serbia), Parlamentny Listy (Czech Republic), The Hill (USA), Hlavne spravy (Slovakia), Topky.sk (Slovakia), Nasz Dziennik (Poland), Wiadomosci (Poland). The corpus was selected based on its content, to be more precise, based on whether the following four topics were present:

1. [O] otherizing (meaning whether the article presents refugees/immigrants as an outgroup, in an Us vs Them dichotomy),
2. [C] criminality (if the discourse recipients are presented as proven or potential criminals),
3. [PEB] political elite blaming (in cases where the rhetoric pegs the blame for immigration onto the political elite),
4. [AI] anti-islamism (in cases in which Islam is presented in a negative light) and
5. [NFP] the rhetoric of a need of protection against refugees.

The sources were looked for based on a Google engine search with keywords in adequate languages such as “(im)migrants”, “(im)migration”, and “refugees”, coupled with search queries containing known xenophobic sources within the contemporary media landscape, ending up in 22 representative articles from 9 countries, as “the corpus size is more manageable and the sub-corpora more comparable when focusing on a topic and partly on essentiality” (Hansen, 2016, p. 118). (Table 1)

As seen in the table 1, alleged criminality, together with a proposed need for protection figure as the most typical trope by which xenophobic discourse is propagated. In a significantly large portion of the representative corpus, refugees and immigrants are presented as criminal – accused of rape, violence, bureaucratic fraud and murder, as well as a homo sacer-like instance, being illegal (thus, criminal) themselves. Being discursively framed as criminal, it is of small wonder that the same rhetoric stresses a ‘need of protection’ against such “criminals” that embodies itself in corresponding policies.

Within the corpus of text, we then looked at how the immigrants and refugees were conceptualized and framed within representative articles, taking a more detailed discursive look into the most prominent methods of propagating a xenophobic sentiment within select articles.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>S/C</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>PEB</th>
<th>AI</th>
<th>NFP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Daily Mail</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Rescue boats? I’d use gunships to stop migrants</td>
<td>NA/ NA</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Daily Mail</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>TWENTY MILLION African migrants heading for Europe: European parliament president warns that a huge number will arrive in the 'next few years' unless action is taken</td>
<td>11,000/150</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Breitbart</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Guardian Sob Story on Deportation of Illegal Alien Ignores Law</td>
<td>0/67</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Breitbart</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>EU president predicts 30 million more migrants will come Europe</td>
<td>3/265</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kurir</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>EKSKLUZIVNO! ISPOVEST MAJKE IZ OBRENOVCA: Migranti hteli da mi otmu dete koje sam čekala 10 godina!</td>
<td>NA/44</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Uued Udised</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Orban:EL häävitab Euroopa veel enne Ungari referendumit kohustusliku pögenikevootide üle</td>
<td>0/N A</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Uued Udised</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Sinine Aratus ännitleb britte iseseisvuspäeva puhul</td>
<td>NA/ N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The Hill</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>The truth about crime, illegal immigrants and sanctuary cities</td>
<td>405/184</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Avpixlat</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Flyttade hem till Irak – fortsatte fuska till sig bidrag från svenska skattebetalare</td>
<td>NA/512</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Avpixlat</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Många migranter registrerar olika personuppgifter hos olika myndigheter</td>
<td>NA/414</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Parlamtny listy</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Rozvoral (SPD): Němci utíkají před arabskými a africkými islámskými imigranty z vlastní země</td>
<td>NA/NA</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Parlamtny listy</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Děti a dívky jsou muslimskými přistěhovalci napadány i znásilňovány a policie to tají.</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We have concentrated on xenophobic textual production within the media; it would be wise to stress at this point that xenophobic rhetoric are promulgated via politicians and political players as well in speeches and public addressing (more often than not via the media that lean towards or fully support xenophobic
rhetoric), yet due to the constrains of a standardized research article, we have concentrated on a corpus of media texts, as “mass media and the apparatus of reaching out to collective minds gain a central role in proliferating, topicalizing, de-topicalizing and creating knowings and/or beliefs” (Khosravinik, 2009, p. 478). In other words, the media possess a “nearly exclusive control over the symbolic resources needed to manufacture popular consent, especially in the domain of ethnic relations” (Teun A Van Dijk, 1991, pp. 42-43). We have thus concentrated our analysis on those media texts that promote xenophobia themselves, setting party programs and discursive presentations of policies aside as source material, as they appear more often than not precisely within the media that support them.

3. Select case-to-case analysis

The mass media are “capable of providing frames of reference or perspective within which people become able to make sense of events and of their experience” (Hartmann & Husband, 1974, p. 16). It is thus important to see in what manner are these frames created, positioned and promulgated via media discourse. The current discursive production within the mediasphere has been increasing drastically, especially during the last several years, and thus, having in mind that “political discourse is constructed interactively, over time and across interlocutors” (Ana, 1999, p. 195), it has reached levels of high salience. We have selected several case-in-point examples from the abovementioned corpus of text for more detailed analysis.

A telling example of not only xenophobic discourse, but their memetic spread as well, comes from the news production that ensued after Antonio Tajani, a former associate of Silvio Berlusconi, “warned” about “millions” of asylum seekers that might be arriving from Africa (ANSA, 2017). These “millions” (a probable exaggeration in itself) became “20 million” (E2) in the version carried over by the Daily Mail (Hargeaves, 2017), increasing to “thirty million” in the Breitbart news piece (E5) that followed suite (Tomlinson, 2017). Exaggeration has been tackled by scholarship (Colston & Keller, 1998; Thurlow, 2006), as it is a common constitutive instance of daily discourse (Kreuz, Kassler, & Coppenrath, 1998), let alone xenophobic. The hyperbole is thus used often in xenophobic rhetoric, for it can “create contrasts between expected and ensuing events” (Colston & O’Brien, 2000, p. 179), as it “present[s] a contrast between the semantic or ‘utterance meaning’ ... and the referent situation that is not presented by the literal comments” (Colston & O’Brien, 2000, p. 180). Having in
mind the counterfactual nature of the xenophobic hyperbole (i.e. 30 million people will not be arriving), this contrast is necessary in order to create an alternate reality in which immigration is an issue to be “worried” about, nowadays increasingly referred to as “alternative facts”, after Kellyanne Conway’s now iconic interview. There is yet another issue in the discursive development of the story, as Tajani initially spoke about “asylum seekers”, which got changed in the Daily Mail and Breitbart rhetoric to “immigrants”. The switch between lexical choices was important, as it diminishes the necessity of help that should be provided to asylum seekers, as contrasted to migrants, a designation used for a person who migrate on their own free will. Thus, such a discursive turn accomplishes moral distancing from those who are in need of assistance.

Another example comes from Serbia. In February 2017, an article was published by the tabloid Kurir (E6), claiming that a group of “migrants” assaulted a mother, trying to kidnap her child that she has “been expecting for ten years”. The snippet was widely shared and sparked a state-wide xenophobic panic. The headline was half-written in capital letters, saying “EXCLUSIVE! CONFESSION OF A MOTHER FROM OBRNOVAC: Migrants wanted to kidnap my child that I have been expecting for 10 years!” (Rafailović, 2017), as “it is headlines that bear the brunt of sensationalizing the news” (Molek-Kozakowska, 2013, p. 175), where further stress is accomplished by the use of capital letters and the exclamation mark. On the same day, nevertheless, the actual story was published, as it turned out that the woman in question was walking with a stroller and several of her male friends, who attacked a group of refugees (TELEGRAF, 2017). In other words, the victims were initially presented as attackers, and vice versa.

This is where one of the key issues in xenophobic discourse needs to be tackled – the so-called “fake news” phenomenon, an extremely salient issue that on the day of the writing of this article has 154 million hits on Google. Surprisingly seldom tackled in scholarship, the fake news phenomenon is almost exclusively dealt with in the sense of satirical, parody-news in the vein of the Onion News, the Daily Show or the Daily Mash (Balmas, 2014; Holt, 2009; Marchi, 2012). Yet in public and media discourse, the denotation of the “fake news” phrase has long since expanded, as strictly speaking, fake news is completely made up and designed to deceive readers to maximize traffic and profit. But the definition is often expanded to include websites that circulate distorted, decontextualized or dubious information through – for example – click
baiting headlines that don’t reflect the facts of the story, or undeclared bias (Hunt, 2016).

We thus need to expand the definition of fake news to include non-parodical, deceptive, counter-factual information pieces based on lack of context and corroboration, commonly declarative and biased in nature, often with a strict aim of misinforming, manipulating and misleading the reader, or the “three Ms of fake news”. This type of “news” is used excessively in xenophobic discursive production. Manipulation, a key feature of such discourse, is defined as a “crucial notion in discourse analysis” (T. A. van Dijk, 2006, p. 359), of which “a well-known example is governmental and/or media discourse about immigration and immigrants, so that ordinary citizens blame the bad state of the economy, such as unemployment, on immigrants and not on government policies” (T. A. van Dijk, 2006, p. 361). Thus, xenophobic fake news will concentrate on manipulating the recipient by either falsely representing RASIM (Refugees, Asylum seekers and Immigrants) groups (such as the claim that “thirty million” will be arriving, or that they kidnap children), or simply engaging in complete counterfactual discourse by, for lack of other words, inventing narratives in order to deceive. The communicative strategy of deception is key to understanding this phenomenon, as it is “a type of manipulation” (Galasinski, 2000, p. 21), drawing on Puzyinina’s definition of deception as an action of influencing the recipient in such a manner as to attain the goals of the manipulator, somewhat in line with Ng’s and Bradac’s definition that concentrates on the deceiver/manipulator providing inaccurate information (Ng & Bradac, 1993). The fake news phenomenon needs to be tackled in much more detail, but due to the constricting limit of standardized research articles, we shall have to omit a more detailed analysis at this point.

This modus operandi is successful due to the fact that “people make strategic inferences from these kinds of discourse, build mental models of ethnic situations and generalize these to general negative attitude schemata or prejudices that embody the basic opinions about relevant minority groups” (T A van Dijk, 1989, p. 203), as every new news snippet serves to strengthen the abovementioned negative attitude.

Another common discursive feature is the attempt to represent immigrants as perpetrators of crimes and contributors to an increasing crime rate. An article written by Ron Martinelli for the Hill (E9) claimed that “illegal immigrants clearly commit a level of violent and drug related crimes disproportionate to their population” (Martinelli, 2017), stating as well that “a population of just over 3.5
percent residing in the U.S. unlawfully committed 22 percent to 37 percent of all murders in the nation”, even though the sources used cannot be corroborated. Martinelli also wrote how “the pro-illegal immigrant lobby consistently misrepresents the criminal involvement of illegal ... saying that illegal immigrants commit less crimes than their counterparts. This assertion is false in most cases”. However, statistics and research claim otherwise, as immigrants are less likely to commit serious crimes or be behind bars than the native-born, and high rates of immigration are associated with lower rates of violent crime and property crime. This holds true for both legal immigrants and the unauthorized, regardless of their country of origin or level of education ... For this reason, harsh immigration policies are not effective in fighting crime (Ewing, Martínez, & Rumbaut, 2015, p. 1).

The (mis)use of statistics is yet another instance tackled by discourse analysts, as “numbers can conjure any meaning out of scant evidence” (Poovey, 1993), so they are often used by xenophobes in their rhetoric (Khosravinik, 2010). Martinelli’s article is loaded with numbers; from paragraph to paragraph, “statistics” are given to overwhelm the reader, who will seldom verify the accuracy of the given data. In this sense, “the news media do not passively describe or record news events in the world, but actively (re-)construct them, mostly on the basis of many types of source discourses. Corporate interests, news values, institutional routines, professional ideologies and news schema formats play an important role in this transformation” (T A van Dijk, 1989, p. 203). This reconstruction can be perpetrated not only by hate-filled text, but by numbers and statistics as well.

Yet more relevant sources come from the Czech Republic, in which, even though “Muslims are a tiny, fragmented minority ... between just 10,000 and 20,000 in this country of more than 10 million”, they have been “forced into the media spotlight, getting an unprecedented amount of attention as the subject of viral, fake stories” (Colborne, 2017), putting “fake stories”, i.e. fake news in the spotlight again. The leading xenophobic portal in the Czech Republic is Parlamentny Listy, where stories about “Germans running away from their native lands” (E12) due to refugees are often published. An article by Radek Rozvoral thus praises Viktor Orban for ignoring Brussels’ dictate and goes around with his own protective politics based on rigid surveillance of Hungarian state borders. He does it well, since it is the only way in which one can put a halt to the invasion and sacking of the country by illegal Muslim immigrants (Parlamentnylisty, 2017b).
Refugees are dubbed “migrants” or “immigrants” within the article, and presented as “invading”. Another article from the same site presents “immigrants” in Sweden as “attacking, beating and raping women” (E13), which is “forcing Swedes to emigrate” (Parlamentnylisty, 2017a). A running theme is the depiction of immigrants outside of the Czech Republic, since, as it was already shown, there is a negligible amount of either Muslims or immigrants (that are rhetorically equated within the discourse) in the country. What van Dijk wrote about xenophobia from over half a century ago is rather appropriate to the abovementioned situation as well, as these negative attitudes, however, were not simply spontaneous reactions of the White population at large, nor merely caused by the economic recession of the 1970s. After all, most people never had any direct contacts with minority group members, nor were they threatened by them in employment, housing, or other social domains. (T A van Dijk, 1989, p. 200).

Due to the lack of scapegoats, in other words, they needed to be introduced externally and discursively. Additionally, as mentioned in the paragraphs above, the rhetorical equation of Muslims with immigrants – the discursive “Other” – is a running topos for the Czech case (as well as many others). This type of semantic equation mentioned above was already noticed by Wodak, who wrote about an ‘interesting semantic process to be observed nowadays: the conflation of two distinct concepts, namely “(im)migrant” and “asylum-seeker”. In debates across the European Union, these two concepts are mixed up’ (Wodak, 2006b, p. 186). In the meantime, the semantic conjoining has expanded to include migrants (immigrants), refugees, asylum-seekers as well as Muslims in some spoken and textual production, an example of which is given in the lines above. All of these should be feared; the portal Svět kolem nas (E22) wrote that people in the Czech Republic should arm themselves, it is a clear gesture of courage and determination to defend yourselves! Get a weapon permit and an adequate weapon. I want to appeal first of all to our ladies. Look at what is happening in Germany, Sweden, and other places. You and your child will be the first victims of immigrant violence and terror ... a gun or a pistol seems to me as an adequate weapon ... a shotgun should be enough for home (Svět kolem nas, 2016).

Van Dijk wrote in 1989 how “discursive discrimination, at least in the more respected media, has shown a tendency of becoming more subtle and indirect, displaying coherence with the more general liberal ideologies of the cultural elite in society” (T A van Dijk, 1989); this is no longer true, as the example (E22) above shows. Though it is true that some discursive formations do have an
indirect, connotative approach, post-ISIS xenophobic production is more
evhement and direct in its discourse. The example above builds on other articles
in which it had already been established that outside of the Czech Republic,
immigrants have already resorted to violence, they are already criminals. It is
taken for granted that immigrants will be, as a simple matter of time, committing
acts of violence. Continuing, essentially, on the rhetoric of Katie Hopkins,
vioence is promoted as a “defense” from alleged violence, in a “reversal of the
perpetrator-victim dichotomy”, as “victimhood is claimed by the original
provocateur” (Wodak, 2015a, pp. 374, 379), an instance we have also seen in the
Kurir example. In order to “defend”, a set of policies is being introduced by
diminishing of human rights, “increasing security” and restricting movement by
building physical and bureaucratic walls, to which we shall now turn our
attention.

4. Discourse becomes policy: physical borders since 2015

Stressing, in essence, the connection between discourse and policy, Pujolar
wrote that when immigrants settle in a given place in (what are perceived to be)
significant numbers, different social actors and institutions begin to comment and
pose questions as to how the incomers should be “managed,” and by doing so
they refer implicitly or explicitly to ideas of what constitutes a community and
how language is connected with community belonging (Pujolar, 2015, p. 303).

This is in line with Schmidt’s Discursive Institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008),
that “focuses on ideational factors which ultimately preside over the making of
common policies and strategies through the lens of discourse” (Carta & Wodak,
2015, p. 5). The public scare that has become public policy, dubbed also the
“politics of fear” (Wodak, 2015b), introduced by xenophobic media and
politicians that was exemplified above thus led to a series of boundary-
establishing policies in the United States and Europe. If there are “thirty million”
refugees arriving, and if they are “kidnapping children”, positioning barriers – be
they physical walls and fences, or bureaucratic ones, such as an increasingly
restrictive visa or border policy – is presented and seen as a logical step in the
“defense” of everyday life. However, “immigration policy is frequently shaped
more by fear and stereotype than by empirical evidence” (Ewing et al., 2015, p.
3), and fear is being introduced in a discursive manner. As Ewing et al wrote,
despite the abundance of evidence that immigration is not linked to higher crime
rates, and that immigrants are less likely to be criminals than the native-born,
many U.S. policymakers succumb to their fears and prejudices about what they
imagine immigrants to be. As a result, far too many immigration policies are drafted on the basis of stereotypes rather than substance (Ewing et al., 2015, p. 10).

These stereotypes are promulgated via specific discursive strategies elaborated on above. As Albrecht noted, “immigration has become a high ranked European concern over the last two decades” (Albrecht, 2002, p. 1), becoming known in public discourse as “Europe’s great migration crisis” (Kern, 2015), even though it is questionable whether this designation should be used; dubbing it an “immigration” crisis will tend to discursively peg the blame onto immigrants, even though “refugees” is a more appropriate term. We would offer the term “xenophobic crisis”, seeing that it is promulgated and perpetuated by xenophobic media and politicians. Due to this rise in xenophobia, borders have been increasing in number throughout Europe. We can broadly categorize them into two types:

(1) one would be a physical border, a wall or fence (such as the border Hungary had built on its southern border with Serbia),

(2) the other would be what is commonly dubbed an “increase in security” (Rosenblum & Hipsman, 2016), embodied in increased border controls between a number of countries and the increase of difficulty for obtaining entry documentation. The same euphemistic phrases (“border security”, “increase in security”) is also used to designate similar restrictionary measures in the USA (Fonseca & Rosen, 2017; Slack, Martínez, Whiteford, & Peiffer, 2015).

By the end of the 20th century, the world was already marked by a significant increase in border control and security, and a corresponding lowering of global mobility (Sassen, 1999), as “contemporary societies are increasingly bastions with borders and control, walls and gates” (Fassin, 2011, p. 214). Since the advent of the refugee crisis, especially from 2015 onward, these boundaries have been increasing in number. A Greece-Turkey land border was created, followed by a fence in Ceuta and Mellilla. Bulgaria followed, raising a razor-wire fence on its border with Turkey. In September 2015, Germany introduced border controls on its border with Austria, negating the Schengen agreement; Austria followed soon after with an increased control on its borders with Hungary and Slovenia. The same month saw the raising of a fence between Hungary and Serbia, on the behest of the extremely xenophobic Prime Minister Viktor Orban, whose anti-refugee discourse has in the meantime become widely known. Slovakia imposed border controls next, while Hungary elongated its fence across the border with Croatia as well. After the terrorist attacks in France, this country
imposed stricter border controls, even though the attacks had no connection to refugees. Slovenia was next, building a razor-wire fence on its border with Croatia; Norway introduced border controls with Sweden due to the influx of immigrants. Macedonia followed, raising up a razor-wire fence on its border with Greece, while in January 2016, Sweden reintroduced its border control with Denmark at the Oresund passageway. Germany strengthened its border control with Switzerland on August 2016. Donald Trump additionally set in motion the building of a wall on the border with Mexico. Enumerating all walls, borders, boundaries and policies would probably entail a monograph unto itself; these are just a few representative examples.

While physical borders were being introduced, bureaucratic policies followed soon thereafter. On March 2016, the questionable EU-Turkey deal came into existence. As Elizabeth Collet, director of the Migration Policy Institute wrote, the 28 EU heads of state forged the March 18 deal with Turkey with their backs seemingly against the wall, and in an atmosphere of palpable panic. At its core, the agreement aims to address the overwhelming flow of smuggled migrants and asylum seekers traveling across the Aegean from Turkey to the Greek islands by allowing Greece to return to Turkey “all new irregular migrants” (Collett, 2016).

The “EU-Turkey refugee deal” soon turned out to be an utter failure, for as Amnesty International reported, “the premise on which the deal was constructed – namely that Turkey is a safe place for refugees – was flawed” (Gogou, 2017). Nevertheless, “over the last year European leaders have sought to portray the EU-Turkey deal as a success, with some even touting it as a model to be replicated elsewhere. To these leaders, the only thing that matters is that the number of irregular arrivals to Europe has fallen significantly” (Gogou, 2017). According to the Asylum Access Global Policy Director, Jessica Therkelsen, the deal was “inhumane” and “failed to protect basic human rights” (Therkelsen, 2017). What it striking is that the policies set in motion were promoted by Right Wing orientated xenophobic media on a global level even in places where the Right Wing is not in power.

5. Conclusion

What Waldinger wrote about USA politics regarding immigration in 2008 can be read and understood on a global level but a decade later: Immigration is roiling American politics, with controversy continuing and no clear solution in sight. As all parties concur, the system is broken, frustrating the new, would-be,
and established Americans, while yielding substantial social costs and tensions... Beyond this point of agreement, however, dissonance is all that can be heard. Many voices are shouting; no one knows where to go (Waldinger, 2008, p. 306).

A significant part of those “shouting voices” are xenophobic in nature, and we have presented the discursive features that they “shout”, including a brusque overview of the policies that followed. Xenophobic discourses, presenting RASIM members as criminals, dangerous, different, have had their production grow in intensity during the last several years significantly. The rhetoric is either based on twisting data and misrepresenting issues, or by blatant fake news instances. Due to the consistent representing of RASIM as criminals, murderers, rapists and thieves, it is of small wonder that walls and borders, be they physical or bureaucratic, are being built. During the last 16 years, “more than 46,000 people have died globally attempting to cross a border... These deaths are a direct consequence of the international community’s collective failure to implement a credible plan of humanitarian aid to refugees” (Mallardo, 2017), having in mind that xenophobic policy is replacing humanitarian aid. The lack of care for the plight of the dispossessed is seen, thus, not only in the vehement xenophobic rhetoric that exists within the press on a global level, but in policy as well, even when those policies are presented as beneficial, such as the failed Turkey-EU deal. As Sager noticed, what was “repeatedly demonstrated” in such cases is that “the response to human suffering is sometimes not compassion, but fear, hate, and opportunism” (Sager, 2016).

References


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